As public concern about the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) has grown, so has the temptation to moralize about it. The Times, for example, recently advised its readers 'that traditional morality is the best way of avoiding a horrible death", A reviewer in The Listener, by contrast, after watching too many television programmes on the subject, despairingly concluded by commending 'Mr Julian Critchley's advice that the only safe pleasure in life is a bag of boiled sweets". Moralizing about medical matters is a risky business for those who are not doctors, and perhaps even for doctors who are not specialists in the relevant area. Certainly as a theologian, initially bemused by such medical headlines as 'AIDS in primates', I have to take seriously the comment of the Catholic theologian Karl Rahnerthat the medical' "detail" of which the theologian is ignorant, or of which he has only a very vague notion ... might be the very detail which would alter the whole conclusion' of his moral argument", What, for example, of the individual who takes The Times' advice and subsequently limits his sexual relationships to one partner? If the 'detail' in his case is that he or his partner, without knowing it, already is infected, he may (as I understand it) be at greater risk of developing AIDS as a result of his moral reformation than if he continued to have casual sexual relationships with partners who happened not to be infected.
In this example, of course, the other side of the moral question is the risk to the casual partners. And again, if they are casual, what guarantee is there that they are not infected? The Times therefore may be justified in hoping that the risks of AIDS 'might well persuade people to avoid even the limited risks of safe sex'. On the other hand, the problem about advocating 'a return to traditional sexual morality' is not only that this morality was often honoured as much in the breach as the observance. It is also that the more liberal sexual morality of the decades before AIDS was supported by intellectually respectable and compassionate arguments which many people still find cogent. AIDS certainly destroys the argument (never very convincing) that sexually transmitted diseases need no longer be taken into account when thinking about sexual morality. But that argument was only one among others leading to the conclusion that human sexuality should be seen in more positive and benign terms than 'traditional morality' generally allowed. Other relevant arguments included those related to population pressures, effective contraception, the changing role ofwomen in society, recognition of the civil liberties of homosexuals and awareness of the significance of the unconscious. Such considerations make a general 'return to traditional morality' less likely, not least because even the old religious arguments for this have lost some of their theological justification. More to the point at present, I think, is the moral response to AIDS which recognizes the benefits as well as the risks of more liberal attitudes to sex, and which encourages responsible behaviour without dividing society.
I shall return to this theme at the end of the paper. At this point I want only to suggest that the desire for simple answers to the moral questions raised by AIDS is not very helpful. The moral questions raised by AIDS, on the whole, are not very simple. Nor, on the other hand, are most of them new: most are perennial problems of medical ethics, albeit raised now with greater public urgency. In what follows, I shall discuss some of these problems -related to medical beneficence, respect for autonomy, compulsory screening, costs and benefits, and confidentialityand conclude by returing to the question of an adequate moral response to AIDS.
Medical beneficence
The risk to those caring for AIDS patients of being infected by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is reliably stated to be 'negligible provided that basic standards appropriate to the care of all patients are applied", Despite this, there have been reports, mostly anecdotal or from the USA, of health-care personnel being unwilling to care for these patients or even for individuals from high-risk groups. Clearly, in surgical, obstetric and other medical contexts there are practical problems about how to minimize the risk of infection to doctors and other carers: in psychiatry these might be involved, for example, in 0141-0768/87/ 050281-03/$02.00/0 "1987 The Royal Society of Medicine the care of potentially dangerous HIV-infected patients. The ethical issues here, however, do not seem to be essentially different from those related on the one hand to the moral obligations of doctors generally, and on the otherto restraining and treating any potentially dangerous patient.
Traditionally, by virtue of their profession, doctors (and to some extent other health workers) assume a moral obligation additional to those which all individuals have towards one another. This special obligation, stated in various codes and deciarations, has been called that of 'medical beneficence', or the particular duty of doctors 'to benefit their patients' health and to some extent the health of others'S. In assuming this obligation throughout history, it has been observed", '... physicians have tacitly accepted an occupational risk of exposure to fatal infectious disease. In fact, much of the prestige and respect accorded to physicians can be directly traced to public regard for the physician's willingness to assume increased personal risk. Only the current generation of physicians, trained after the development ofeffective antibiotics, has never encountered this potential occupational risk.'
It would be impertinent of me, as someone not called to face this occupational risk, to comment further on the obligations of medical beneficence. The subject, however, does underline the importance of appropriate counselling, and discussion of ethical issues 7 , among medical students, junior doctors and nurses whose training may oblige them to be involved in the care of AIDS patients. Two American clinicians with experience of the area have pointed out" that 'as the providers most often at the bedside, students and house officers could be considered most vulnerable if a significant occupational risk did exist. This combination of highest perceived risk with the most limited opportunity for avoiding patient care responsibility causes substantial stress. This stress may in turn influence the quality of medical decisions. For example, a house officer may urge early discharge of a patient because he or she fears AIDS or disapproves of the patient's social or sexual orientation. House officers, overworked to begin with, are additionally burdened by caring for AIDS patientsnot only because of the complexities of the disease, but also because confounding ethical issues are raised, which are left unaddressed in most training programmes.'
Respect for autonomy
The house officer urging early discharge of an AIDS patient illustrates the important ethical point that clinical choices should not be clouded by inappropriate extraneous considerations. Much the same point emerges in relation to the question of restraining a potentially dangerous HIV-infected patient. There can be little doubt that when a patient's behaviour is demonstrably dangerous to innocent bystanders, the principle of respect for the patient's autonomy may be subordinated to that of the innocent bystander's right not tobehanned. The real problems here are the clinical ones of judging the seriousness and likelihood of the risk, and of deciding what restraint and treatment are appropriate within the law. These clearly are questions which must be left, in individual cases, to the judgment of the responsible clinician or clinical team.
Compulsory screening
Patients suffering from AIDS or individuals infected with HIV may be considered dangerous, of course, not only to doctors and other health workers, but also to other uninfected individuals or to the public health. The moral choices here are political as well as clinical, and are commonly raised in relation to screening. Screening in general raises questions about its costs and benefits, about confidentiality concerning its findings, and about whether it should be compulsory or voluntary. The least controversial of these questions perhaps is the last.
Compulsory screening, for health as for security reasons, can be justified morally as a known condition of certain contracts, including those of employment, voluntarily entered into. Its extension beyond this is more difficult to justify, on the grounds both of civil liberty and of utility. Historically, the issues were rehearsed in the nineteenth-century debate about the Contagious Diseases Acts", Under these, compulsory medical inspection of prostitutes serving soldiers and sailors was tolerated for a time, mainly because they were members of a politically powerless minority. Given the extent of nineteenth-century clandestine prostitution however, it is doubtful if the Acts were ever very effective as a public health measure. Ignorance of the extent and distribution of HIV infection today makes the utility of compulsory screening no less doubtful, while the injustice of compulsory screening of high-risk groups is likely to be even less politically acceptable than it was a century ago.
Voluntary screening: costs and benefits
The costs and benefits of voluntary screening (assuming a reliable and reproducible test) are more arguable. On the one hand there are those who argue that, in the absence of any effective treatment or vaccine, the limited benefits of routine screening are outweighed by its costs to the individual found to be infected. Cogent reasons for this are set out in a paper by David Miller and others", who suggest also that routine screening is less likely to achieve its professed public health goals than are educational efforts directed to behavioural change. Others, for example Professor Bracken of Yale, argue that 'it is less efficient (and almost certainly less effective) to try and educate the entire population' than to concentrate educational and preventive measures on those identified as infected. Screening, Professor Bracken claims, 'does not need to be universally mandatory if large enough sections of the population volunteer'", Against this view, however, Dr Liam Donaldson has observed that 'the lessons of other screening programmes are that the group at greatest risk are the least likely to come forward for screening!", Here, clearly, we are in the midst of a debate which will have to be settled on empirical rather than ethical grounds.
Confidentiality
The traditional rule of medical confidentiality also involves empirical considerations: if patients did not believe that doctors kept their secrets, they might not disclose the full information, or provide the cooperation needed for optimal care. In the case of sexually transmitted diseases, treatment of the presenting patient has seemed the best way of protecting others; and the rule of medical confidentiality has been observed more strictly here than in many other areas of medicine.
The advent of a new, and fatal, sexally transmitted disease questions this practice, however. A general practitioner, for example, may face a genuine moral dilemma if his HIV-infected patient wishes to keep his diagnosis secret from a wife or sexual partners who also are patients of the GP. The problems here may be as much those of communication as of ethics. But if all ways round the problem fail, breaking the rule of medical confidentiality seems justifiable only as a rare exception, since if the rule is broken often or openly, it loses its utility.
A further argument against breaking the rule may be of particular relevance if the others potentially at risk are not patients of the doctor involved. The doctor who keeps his patient's secrets, hoping that the patient will take his advice about responsible sexual behaviour, is upholding a value (respect for autonomy) which is as important to the survival of civilization as preventing the spread of AIDS is to the survival of threatened individuals. In this respect, it may be argued, the doctor's unique role in society creates a special responsibility towards his patient, even if this makes it more difficult for the doctor to discharge his ordinary moral obligations towards innocent bystanders who may be at risk.
An adequate moral response to AIDS The questions discussed above are only a few of the perennial problems of medical ethics which AIDS raises with particular urgency, and which are becoming increasingly apparent in a variety ofmedical contexts stretching from antenatal to terminal care. I will conclude, however, by returning to the question raised at the beginning of this paper, about an adequate moral response to AIDS.
Most responsible commentators seem to agree that the best, and at present perhaps the only hope of limiting the spread of infection, is through public education and in particular education and counselling of those most at risk. One feature of greater public awareness of the phenomenon of AIDS, however, is the development of punitive attitudes towards homosexuals and drug abusers in particular, combined with the view that AIDS is some kind of divine punishment for 'permissiveness'. This view, as many church leaders have now observedII, is theological nonsense, particularly at odds with the attitude of the founder of Christianity. If there is a moral and theological issue related to AIDS, it may have more to do with what a recent article in The Tablet l 2 described as 'the Church's continued refusal to sanction homosexual genital expression in the context of stable, faithful relationships'. According to the author of this article, many homosexual men whom he interviewed in the United States agreed with the sentiments of one who stated that 'Ifyou're a gay male burdened with a strict Catholic upbringing that's poisoned your mind and heart with loads of guilt and self-rejection, indiscriminate promiscuity becomes particularly attractive'. It served, this man thought, 'as a drug to help forget the "brutality and abuse" the Church had heaped upon the homosexual'.
'Repeatedsexual conquests could also boost a deflatedand devastated ego and compensate for "inferiority" fostered Journal ofthe RoyalSocietyof Medicine Volume 80 May 1987 283 by the Church's insistence that homosexual people were "disordered". Such behaviour could also serve as a way to punish oneself by contracting AIDS simply because one "deservesthe dreadfuldisease".'
What sentiments of this kind suggest, I believe, is that public education about AIDS should be based on a more realistic and positive appreciation of human sexuality than is allowed for by those who see the answer in 'a return to traditional sexual morality'. The need for this appreciation will become apparent as growing numbers of people become infected who are neither homosexual nor drug abusers. The danger then, I suspect, will be less that of punitive attitudes to minorities than that of profound depression about the future of humanity and a breakdown ofthe relationships of trust necessary for civilization to flourish. In these circumstances, the contribution of sexuality's benign and humanizing aspects will be more necessary than ever, if only to keep our psychiatric services from being swamped.
Thus the need at present is for public education not only to state the facts about AIDS, but also to embody a response to it which finds meaning in moral com. plexity. The complexity is that of a world in which the dead are mourned, the sick and dying cared for, sensible precautions against infection adopted, treatments for AIDS and a vaccine sought, and life and sexuality enjoyed, not desperately but steadily. Finding meaning in such moral complexity will not be easy; and in the end, tragically, society may not find it. On the other hand, the consequences of AIDS for future generations may yet be a deeper appreciation of the meaning both of human sexuality and of human solidarity. One of the early Christian fathers argued that the purpose of baptism was 'to make us children of choice and understanding rather than of compulsion and ignorance'P, The ultimate moral challenge of AIDS is not very different.
